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Competing to Cut Carbon: State Policies,
Conflicts with Federally-Regulated Energy
Markets, and recommendations
Arshak Zakarian

INTRODUCTION
Wholesale power markets currently face challenges from changes in
federal regulations and advancements in technology, which have
significantly changed the composition of energy generation sources across
the United States over the last two decades.1 States have relied
increasingly on policy to increase the presence of clean energy sources in
their power mix, such as nuclear energy, due to its reliability and
environmental benefits.2
Natural gas, wind, and solar have seen
unprecedented growth in the last five years due to declining fuel source and
technology costs.3 Utilities companies and private companies have
invested significantly in infrastructure and technology research, attempting
to find success in the ever-changing wholesale power markets.
Nuclear power has struggled to become economically competitive as a
source of energy for electricity generation in the United States. The federal
government has provided substantial subsidies for renewable energy, while
subsidies for coal and nuclear have declined.4 Additionally, with the recent
 Arshak Zakarian, J.D., UC Hastings College of the Law (2018); B.S., Environmental
Economics and Policy, UC Berkeley (2013). I would like to thank Abraham Cable, Professor of Law,
for his supervision and feedback on this Note and Sierra Martinez, Adjunct Professor and Program
Director at the Energy Foundation, for his course in Energy Law and introduction to this issue. I also
wish to acknowledge the Hastings Business Law Journal Editorial Board for their support in editing this
Note.
1. Paul Hibbard et al., Electricity Markets, Reliability and the Evolving U.S. Power System, at 6,
Analysis Group (June 2017), http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing
/ag_markets_reliability_final_june_2017.pdf.
2. See Gavin Bade, 10 trends shaping the electric utility industry in 2017, UTILITYDIVE (Jan.
23, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/10-trends-shaping-the-electric-utility-industry-in-2017/
434541/ [https://perma.cc/BY6G-8LC8].
3. Id.
4. See Rep. Lamar Smith, Tax Subsidies For Renewables Now Far Outpaces Fossil Fuels, Real
Clear Energy (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2017/04/28/tax_subsidies_for_
renewables_now_far_outpaces_fossil_fuels_110217.html [https://perma.cc/PY2J-X7HY].
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natural gas boom and influx of renewable energy sources, the price of
electricity has dropped, resulting in lower profit margins and increased
competition.5 New developments in technology and regulations have
raised legal questions about the Federal Power Act (FPA) that have not
been answered by the courts or federal agencies. The FPA, adopted in
1935, leaves ambiguity about the regulation of intricate components of the
energy system and the roles of states and regional commissions in
encouraging competition and ensuring environmental benefits.
New York and Illinois, states that were home to early growth in the
electricity sector, have recently challenged the boundaries of state authority
over energy markets and drafted legislation to protect in-state nuclear
energy generation by providing payments in the form of zero emission
credits (ZECs).6 Energy market participants and administrators claim that
these subsidies have potential to impact regional energy markets and
private investment permanently over the long-term, activities over which
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) arguably retains
authority. However, federal district courts in both New York and Illinois
have recently upheld state programs intended to incentivize carbon-free
electricity generation sources to participate in federally-regulated power
markets.7
Part I of this Note will provide background on federal and state
regulation of the energy industry, focusing on key pieces of federal
legislation, FERC orders, and technological advancements in the energy
sector.
Part II will provide an overview of the nuclear energy industry and the
wholesale power markets in which New York and Illinois operate. Part II
will also provide an overview of the state programs intended to incentivize
nuclear power.
Part III will discuss FERC authority over wholesale power markets,
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and recent case law regarding the New
York and Illinois nuclear subsidy programs. Part III will also discuss
recent proposals addressing potential market distortions from these
programs and conclude that successful integration of federal and state goals
in regulating energy markets requires careful coordination and
implementation.

5. See Robbie Orvis, The state of US wholesale power markets: Is reliability at risk from low
prices?, UTILITYDIVE (May 22, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-state-of-us-wholesalepower-markets-is-reliability-at-risk-from-low-pr/443273/ [https://perma.cc/P99G-XBR7].
6. See infra note 126; see also infra note 146.
7. Id.
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I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY AND WHOLESALE
POWER MARKETS
A. THE GROWTH OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY AND REGULATION
The electric utility industry began to form in the late nineteenth
century when Thomas Edison established a utility business in New York
City’s financial district in 1882, consisting “of steam engines, generators,
and a wiring network designed to illuminate electric lights in restaurants
and shops.”8 With the invention of alternating current in the 1880s, which
could overcome physical limits of “long-distance transmission and
distribution of power,” utility companies were able to grow “into giant,
centralized electric power corporations–corporations that quickly became
classed with railroad companies as both public necessities and public
demons.”9
It was not long before there were opportunities in the electricity sector
for capitalizing on investments in technology risk. With the invention of
the steam turbine in 1884 in England, Samuel Insull, secretary to Edison
for eleven years, became president of Chicago Edison Company in 1892
and quickly gained advantage over rival Chicago power companies.10
Using cost-effective turbine generators at 5000-kilowatt (kW) capacity,
Insull grew his customer base, bought rival firms, and employed various
business practices to dominate the market.11 This consolidation of market
power was contrary to the first visions of the electricity market as a freely
operating exchange of competitive firms that were expected to “ensure
good service and reasonable prices.”12 Among other issues, market power
intertwined with local politics soon led to corruption and adoption of other
models such as municipalization, in which city governments owned and
operated electric utility assets.13 Indeed, by the 1930s, “[p]ower companies
remained the only source of political support. Regulators [at the state
level] therefore did little to offend their masters.”14 In the absence of
federal regulation over utility operations and transfers of electricity, state
commissions were often composed of incompetent professionals

8. RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 12 (The MIT Press, 1999); see also id. at 13 (General
Electric Company was formed in 1892).
9. Hirsh, supra note 8, at 13.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1314 (“After installing a 5-MW unit in 1905, Insull’s Commonwealth Edison purchased
12-MW machines in 1911”); id. at 46.
12. Id. at 14.
13. Id. at 14 (“Insull, for example, regularly dealt with dishonest Chicago politicians who tried to
extort huge payments in return for maintaining his monopoly.”).
14. Id. at 45.
THE
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“interested in obtaining a steady job for at least the next six years.”15
Regulations soon formed to oversee utility operations, since the rise of
holding companies and the inherent monopolistic nature of the electrical
system resulted in consolidated market power over customer bases.16
Utilities controlled the transmission and distribution systems in each
market and provided services at costs far below that of competitors, which
prevented other utilities from entering and providing electricity service to
their customers.17 This control over customer bases and ability to collect
increasing revenues arguably allowed utility companies to attract the
capital necessary to match the growing infrastructure needs in the sector,
since the cost of utility construction rose from $500 million in 1902 to
more than $2 billion in 1912.18 The theory of natural monopoly that
allowed such growth held that monopolistic utilities avoided duplicate
construction and operation of electricity service infrastructure such as
transmission lines and distribution facilities, which “contributed to
society’s welfare” since it reduced resource waste.19 With the passage of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) in 1935, regulations
impacting market power and investment in the electric industry began to
take form, attempting to break apart large utility companies engaging in
anti-competitive practices and heavy advertising campaigns aimed at
maintaining their monopoly status.20
The Federal Power Act (FPA), adopted in 1935, was intended to
address the regulatory gap (known as the “Attleboro Gap”) in the
regulation of interstate electricity transfers, authority not held by the
states.21 Congress established FERC and gave it authority over the
increased transfers of interstate electricity services occurring in the early
twentieth century.22

15. Id. at 43.
16. Everest Schmidt, A Call for Federalism: The Role of State Government in Federally
Controlled Energy Markets, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 578 (2016).
17. Id. at 576 n.11 (discussing a natural monopoly in the context of electricity utilities).
18. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 34 (“Already in 1910, the industry had become among the most
capital intensive in the country, requiring five dollars of investment to earn one dollar in annual
income”).
19. Hirsh, supra note 8, at 124.
20. Id. at 40 (“The [Federal Trade] Commission reported in 1934 that utility advertising
campaigns, costing as much as $30 million per year, were second in magnitude only to government
propaganda efforts during wartime”).
21. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927) (holding that
states cannot regulate interstate electricity transfer since it is an “imposition of a direct burden upon
interstate commerce, from which the state is restrained by the force of the commerce clause”); see also
United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 308 (1953) (holding that the Federal Power Act
“was intended to ‘fill the gap’ . . . left by Attleboro in utility regulation.”).
22. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation
in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 822 (2016).
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Section 201 of the FPA provides that the federal government has
authority over “that part of such business which consists of the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” and its power will “extend
only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”23
This section explicitly grants states jurisdiction over “facilities used for the
generation of electric energy,” such as nuclear energy facilities and natural
gas-fired power plants.24 Section 205 of the FPA states that “[a]ll rates and
charges made . . . by any public utility for or in connection with the
transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such
rates or charges shall be just and reasonable . . . .”25 Lastly, Section 206
allows the Commission to intervene and remedy rates or regulations that it
finds to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential . . .
.”26 Arguably, “one of the intentions of the FPA was to draw a bright line
distinguishing state and federal jurisdiction.”27 However, as this discussion
of state nuclear energy subsidies will show, defining a bright line can be
difficult and troubling for both state and federal regulators accomplishing
conflicting goals.
Until the 1980s, FERC regulated the wholesale electricity markets by
reviewing negotiated contracts “based on cost-of-service” principles.28
Following the conclusion of World War II, electric utility companies
enjoyed the advantages of vertical integration of their firms, successfully
exploiting the “grow-and-build strategy” to meet the constant growth that
occurred for most of the middle-twentieth century.29 Vertically-integrated
utilities, “owning generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure
. . . rarely needed to purchase wholesale electricity,” leaving few
opportunities for federal intervention in wholesale energy transactions.30

23. Federal Power Act of 1935 § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2015).
24. Federal Power Act of 1935 16 U.S.C. § 824(b).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
26. 16 U.S.C. §824(e).
27. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 583.
28. Ari Peskoe, Integrating Markets and Public Policy in New England Wholesale Electricity
Markets: Legal Analysis, Harvard Law School, Discussion Draft, at 5, (Oct. 27, 2016),
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/IMAPP-Memo-Harvard-Environmen
tal-Policy-Initiative-10-27-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4LP-Q5E5] (rather than filing approval for
contracts based on costs, sellers requested the ability to sell energy at market-based rates).
29. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 55; see also Schmidt, supra note 16, at 583.
30. Giovanni S. Saarman Gonzalez, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act:
Promoting Clean Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1422, 1432 (2016).
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B. THE RISE OF REGULATIONS ENCOURAGING COMPETITION AND
REGIONAL COOPERATION
During the 1970s, advancements in energy technologies began
reaching barriers in operational efficiency improvements during a time of
political turmoil that separately resulted in oil and gas shortages, ultimately
called “the Energy Crisis” of the 1970s.31 It “highlighted the wasteful ways
by which Americans produced and consumed energy . . . caused major
shifts in customers’ behavior and spurred legislation that altered the way
utilities did business.”32 Indeed, “these developments resulted in much
greater scrutiny and criticism of the traditional approach to regulating
utilities and setting electricity rates.”33 The series of federal legislative
enactments and FERC Orders following the Energy Crisis were aimed
largely at promoting competition in wholesale electricity markets to
encourage energy efficiency, innovation, and technological advancement,
while introducing considerations of environmental impacts from economic
activities.
One of the most important pieces of legislation impacting energy
markets, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), notably
Section 210, was passed in 1978.34 Addressing energy efficiency at the
energy generation source, PURPA intended to incentivize more efficient
electricity generation through unconventional sources, including
cogeneration technology.35 In a challenge to the traditional, verticallyintegrated utility which controlled much of its energy generation supply for
most of the twentieth century, “[c]ogenerator entrepreneurs . . . employed
modular, small-scale technology (such as gas turbines),” and in the 1990s,
“they found they could beat utility costs by a margin of 5 to 15 percent.”36
In converting fuel to electricity, technology such as combined-cycle
cogeneration was able to achieve an efficiency of 50 percent or better, well
above the range of traditional utility power plants at 35 percent to 40
percent.37 Cogenerators and other independent power producers were able
to provide electricity at lower costs by developing smaller-scale power
plants that operated with more efficient and cost-effective technology as
compared to larger, traditional utility power plants that were providing
most of the electricity generation prior to PURPA.38

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 59.
Id. at 58.
See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 830.
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3) (2000).
See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 81.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.
Id.
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Some states adopted bidding schemes for markets to balance energy
supply and demand, with independent energy suppliers and utilities
participating to find efficient market outcomes.39 The principle was this:
“By encouraging bids from nonutility generators, power companies would
only purchase the amount of electricity they needed. Competition among
independent producers . . . would establish the effective avoided cost, thus
leading to lower prices for utilities and their customers.”40 For example, in
1986, Virginia Power, a utility company, sought to procure 1000 MW of
future energy reserves for meeting its customer demand in 1990 through an
energy auction in which it received electricity generation bids (i.e. offers to
provide future energy capacity) exceeding 5000 MW capacity in total.
From this multitude of offers, it selected seven different independent
energy producers totaling 1178 MW to provide the needed capacity.41 The
influx of energy producers providing offers allowed the bidding mechanism
to succeed in areas that adopted this system.42
PURPA “required utilities to purchase or sell electricity from nonutility owned cogeneration facilities and small power generators,” which
were known as qualifying facilities at 80-MW or less, at the rate equal to
their own cost of service and not the prevailing market rate for energy,
which was significantly lower.43 Instead of purchasing electricity from
their own vertically-integrated power supply, PURPA required utilities to
purchase power generated from these smaller, more efficient power plants.
However, utilities, still owning most of the energy infrastructure needed to
transfer the power being produced from these independent generators (e.g.,
transmission and distribution systems), were opposed to the growth of
independent power producers whose electricity they now had to “wheel”
across their system.44 With regard to any unfairness resulting from this
imbalance of power, FERC, interpreting provisions of the FPA, “concluded
that rates that are freely negotiated by sophisticated market participants
would meet § 205’s just and reasonable standard” and that the two parties
would negotiate acceptable terms and conditions for their transactions.45
To address these barriers to economic competition, such as higher
costs charged by utilities for transmission for non-utility owned electricity,

39. Id. at 126.
40. Id. (providing discussion of avoided cost and bidding principles under PURPA).
41. Id. (often, these contracts to provide power were negotiated at attractive prices that pleased
power purchasers).
42. Id.
43. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 585; see also What is a Qualifying Facility?, FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp
[https://perma.cc/RK9G-64VQ].
44. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 587.
45. See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 5.
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Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992), which
“exempted firms that exclusively sold energy at wholesale from the
PUHCA ownership restrictions” established at the beginning of the
twentieth century.46 EPAct 1992 also “strengthened FERC’s authority to
increase access to transmission services” by allowing third parties to access
these services.47 FERC accomplished this Congressional mandate by
passing Order 888 in 1996, which “prohibited owners and operators of
monopoly transmission facilities from denying transmission access, or
offering only inferior access, to other power suppliers in order to favor the
monopolists’ own generation and increase monopoly profits.”48 This meant
that traditional utilities were required to share their infrastructure, such as
transmission and distribution infrastructure, with competing independent
power producers and treat them on fair and reasonable terms when
charging them for access to their infrastructure.
FERC soon passed Order 2000 after concluding that in order to fully
promote competition in the existing marketplace, it needed to establish
standards for optional development of Regional Transmission Operators
(RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs).49 These organizations
took over management of the electricity grid, ensuring regional competitive
markets were operating successfully within FERC’s guidelines.50
RTOs/ISOs qualify as public utilities that fall under the jurisdiction of
FERC, and under Section 205, FERC has authority to review tariff
amendments and procedures set by these “supervisory” organizations.51
However, “FERC plays ‘an essentially passive and reactive’ role under §
205” in reviewing rates that are just and reasonable.52 These non-profit
organizations whose boards could be composed of representatives from
different states now control and operate most transmission lines.53 FERC
encouraged but did not require these regional markets, and although this
allowed “a new class of independent power producers or merchant
generators” to enter and compete with the existing utility companies, not all
states adopted the RTO/ISO model.54
Today, three regulatory models of electricity dominate the United
States: (1) the traditional cost-of-service model; (2) the fully-restructured

46. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 588.
47. See Gonzalez, supra note 30, at 1436.
48. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 588, quoting FERC Order No. 888, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274-01
(Mar. 14, 1997) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
49. See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 5, quoting FERC Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7, citing Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9 (2002).
53. See Gonzalez, supra note 30, at 1437.
54. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 831.
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model; and (3) a hybrid model combining RTO/ISO management with
regulated, monopoly retail services provided to investor-owned utilities
(IOUs).55 New York and Illinois operate under the fully-restructured
model, which “combines competitive wholesale power markets with retail
choice in the provision of electricity service,” with wholesale power
markets and bulk transmission administered by RTOs/ISOs that ensure
real-time and future energy demands are met.56 Retail electricity providers
(REPs) (e.g., those who buy power and sell to individual customers, similar
to Virginia Power discussed above) purchase power in wholesale markets
through long-term power purchase agreements with independent power
producers, who aim to generate low-cost electricity for purchase by these
REPs in regional markets.57 These REPs, aiming to keep the price of their
electricity service low, must then compete in the marketplace for individual
consumers, unlike traditional or hybrid regulatory models that grant
regulated monopoly retail territories to electricity providers.58
In a traditionally-regulated state, state commissions regulate mostly
vertically-integrated utilities through the cost-of-service principles
established through the 1980s, which allow utilities and state commissions
to collaborate in rate-setting proceedings to establish appropriate electricity
prices that these companies can charge customers.59 Utilities in these states
do not participate in regional wholesale energy markets to purchase the
electricity necessary for their customer bases.
In restructured states, REPs participate in wholesale power markets,
and state commissions develop rules regarding collateral matters, such as
qualifications for an energy provider selling to an in-state REP, rather than
reviewing and approving prices in the wholesale power markets; the rules
for which are mostly independent from state intervention.60 Therefore,
utilities providing electricity to individual customers in traditional states
purchase power from REPs who control their own supply chain, while
restructured states allow REPs to participate and purchase power from
wholesale markets at prevailing market rates.
Restructured states initially saw higher rates for customers in their
regions than traditionally-regulated states, but by 1998, the gap between
them narrowed, and restructured states’ rates more closely followed gas
prices, implying that impacts on prices for consumers were a result of

55. Id. at 834.
56. Id. at 837.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 837.
59. Id. at 827 (a rate case involved presenting evidence of capital investments in utility assets and
establishing a fair rate of return sufficient to finance investments in these assets).
60. Id. at 836–38.
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market fluctuations in the price of natural gas, an increasingly common fuel
input source for independent power generation.61 The vision of a
competitive marketplace under restructured states is becoming reality, since
“[i]n 1997 only 1.6% of U.S. electricity was produced by generation owned
by firms classified as Independent Power Producers. That figure rose to
25% by 2002 and was just under 35% in 2012.”62
RTO/ISO management of nuclear energy generation in the New York
and Illinois regions is critical, since state policies substantially influence
the participants in wholesale power markets. In these regions, there is also
a substantial number of nuclear plants, which typically serve as a large,
inflexible source of power that could potentially cause curtailment, or
prohibit entry altogether, of less expensive sources of energy such as wind
or solar power. Nuclear power is important as a base load electricity
source that provides reliability and stability for the electricity grid.
The Energy Information Institute (EIA) defines base load power plants
as plants that are required to provide all or part of the minimum electricity
load (i.e., demand) and that operate continuously, maximizing system
mechanical and thermal efficiency and minimizing system operating
costs.63 Providing the minimum load for various electricity grid regions
can help ensure electricity system reliability, and continuous operation
helps reduce shutdown and startup costs as well as achieve various other
efficiencies. Traditionally, coal and nuclear plants provided most of the
base load power for utilities, and renewable energy sources such as wind
and solar were considered intermittent energy sources.64
However, the focus of state regulators and RTO/ISO administrators
recently has been on flexibility and variability rather than continuous base
load output, advantages which wind and solar energy combined with other
technologies such as energy storage can provide.65 State efforts to
encourage specific types of energy generation has created conflicts between
efforts to ensure local grid reliability and promote clean energy with federal
goals of ensuring regional competition and technological advancement
through incentivizing innovation.
FERC Order 1000 “requires
transmission owners to develop regional plans that consider transmission

61. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of
Restructuring, 7 ANNU. REV. ECON. 17-18 (2015).
62. Id. at 67.
63. Glossary – “B”, ENERGY INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary
/index.php?id=B [https://perma.cc/6X5S-FFF9].
64. Clint Wilder, Baseload v. Flexibility: Standing the Traditional Generation Model on its Head,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/
2016/10/baseload-vs-flexibility-standing-the-traditional-generation-model-on-its-head.html
[https://perma.cc/E2Y4-BCGA].
65. Id.
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needs driven by public policy, including states’ renewable mandates,” since
these policies can “‘directly affect the need for interstate transmission
facilities, which is squarely within [FERC]’s jurisdiction.’”66 However,
FERC cautioned against broad exercise of RTO/ISO authority (and
ultimately FERC authority) over considering state policies in planning.67
As discussed below, FERC has approved numerous state policy programs
that substantially impact wholesale power markets by selectively
encouraging investment in particular energy generation sources or
increasing regulations to economically burden carbon-emitting sources.

II. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND STATE SUBSIDY PROGRAMS
A. NUCLEAR ENERGY HISTORY, INTERACTION WITH ELECTRICITY
MARKETS, AND CURRENT TRENDS
One of the most challenging endeavors for the United States
government and other developed nations this century is reducing carbon
dioxide emissions from the energy generation sector, while having a
reliable energy supply that can support economic growth.68 Nuclear energy
technology can deliver large capacities of power with zero emissions
during the electricity generation process and has “provided almost 20% of
electrical generation in the United States for over the past two decades.”69
In 2016, electricity generation from nuclear sources resulted in a reduction
of 553.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide.70 However, drawbacks for
nuclear power include long construction times and high costs that may be
difficult to predict.71

66. See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 14, citing FERC Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at para.
111 (2011).
67. Id.; see also, S.C. Pub. Serv. Authority v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding
that Order 1000 merely establishes a process by which utilities are first to consider whether the policies
may affect the wholesale market prior to any determinations by FERC).
68. Phungmayo Horam, Climate change challenges post-U.S. exit from Paris Climate Agreement,
BEAM MAGAZINE (July 25, 2017), https://medium.com/thebeammagazine/climate-change-challengespost-u-s-exit-from-paris-climate-agreement-f1dcf9391bdb [https://perma.cc/V9UX-NQD8].
69. Nuclear Reactor Technologies, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES,
https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies [https://perma.cc/T6VG-SLQP]); see also U.S.
Capacity Factors by Fuel Type, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, https://www.nei.org/KnowledgeCenter/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants/US-Capacity-Factors-by-Fuel-Type [https://perma.
cc/97C6-GB3G] (noting that in 2015, nuclear energy generation in the United States averaged a
capacity factor of 92.2%, meaning that nuclear energy technology is significantly more efficient at
achieving fuel conversion and output).
70. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Emissions Avoided by U.S. Nuclear Industry,
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/emissions-avoided-by-us-nuc
ear-industry [https://perma.cc/923M-AE3K]; U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Electricity
Generation Fuel Shares, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/uselectricity-generation-fuel-shares-1949-2016 [https://perma.cc/QR68-BHRM].
71. DECONSTRUCTING ENERGY LAW AND POLICY: THE CASE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 16 (Raphael J.
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Nuclear power emerged as a source of electricity generation after
World War II, and researchers in 1980 found that the “prospects for nuclear
energy depend on a variety of factors: the success of energy conservation,
the long-term competitiveness of nuclear energy, the growth of coal
production,” and the risk of future accidents and regulatory environments.72
With regard to competition, “nuclear energy in the US has significant
competition as an electricity supply source, not just from coal and gas, but
increasingly from renewable energy.”73 Arguably, the fragmentation of the
United States electricity markets in the latter part of the twentieth century
caused financial difficulties for nuclear energy companies who often
designed plans for large scale electricity supply projects and dealt with
multiple regional electricity markets and regulations.74 Large-scale
projects often require guarantees of revenue returns in the form of power
purchase agreements before companies can raise necessary capital for
construction, and competition has introduced uncertainty in receiving
revenues and cost recovery.75 Regarding subsidies, states have a significant
role in the development of new nuclear plants. However, the deregulation
of electricity markets (i.e., establishment of regional competitive markets)
creates “a conflict with considerable tension between states’ attempts to
manage their economies, environments and financial resources.”76
The nuclear sector has seen a lack of commitments from the federal
government over the last two decades as far as financial incentives and
support.77 Most importantly, inaction on a carbon market or carbon tax,
which would provide financial rewards to carbon-free electricity generation
sources such as nuclear energy through market mechanisms, has failed to
give nuclear energy a cost advantage regarding its non-CO2-producing
electricity production.78 Indeed, “[t]he costs associated with carbon
dioxide emissions are generally not reflected in electricity market prices.”79
In 2013, nuclear received approximately $1.7 billion in energy-specific
Heffron ed., Edinburgh University Press, 2015); see also id. at 28 (noting that “the US Federal
government has been slow . . . to resolve and fund research” in nuclear waste management).
72. Id. at 1; see also id. at 19 (In 2016, nuclear energy faced competition from energy efficiency,
renewable energy, the declining cost of energy due to an influx of natural gas in wholesale energy
markets, and public opposition due to domestic and international accidents.).
73. Id. at 64.
74. Id. at 65.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 72.
77. Id. at 99.
78. Id.
79. Justin Gundlach & Romany Webb, Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets: Federal and
State Issues, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 26 (Feb. 2017), http://colum
biaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/02/Gundlach-Webb-2017-02-Carbon-Pricing-in-NYISO-Markets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8E2M-L78A] (discussing societal costs of carbon dioxide emissions as economic
externalities from a lack of price on carbon and a resulting market failure).
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subsidies, while natural gas received $2.3 billion and renewables received
over $15 billion.80 Nonetheless, “[t]he share of nuclear generation owned
by [independent power producers] rose from zero in 1997 to almost 50% in
2012, as utilities sold off their nuclear assets.”81 Capital expenditures in the
industry peaked in 2012 at $9.02 billion but have since steadily decreased,
and in 2017 capital spending totaled $5.34 billion.82 Total generating costs,
which include capital, fuel, and operating costs, also decreased by 19
percent since 2012 due to decreases in capital expenditures, fuel, and
operations costs.83
Under President Donald Trump, the nuclear industry has already seen
proposals to support its survival and is hoping that the federal government
will intervene more than the Obama administration and save an ailing
industry.84 The current energy supply mix is changing, and nuclear plants
that traditionally received preferable regulatory treatment with regard to
cost recovery are now facing challenges from natural gas, which will likely
continue to make nuclear plant construction or operation uneconomical
given its low prices.85 Indeed, former Chief Executive Officer of Exelon
Corporation, the largest producer of nuclear power, noted that “[a]s long as
natural gas is anywhere near current price forecasts, you can’t
economically build a merchant nuclear plant.”86 Since 2013, six nuclear
reactors . . . have shut down permanently, and several energy companies
have announced plans to close six additional plants throughout the U.S
between 2019 and 2025.87
When nuclear plants close, they often have disproportionate impacts
on the towns they operate in, as well as nearby regions. For example, the
Vermont Yankee nuclear plant closure, due to competitive market
pressures, had devastating economic impacts on the town of Vernon,
80. Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Fiscal Year 2013 (Table ES2.
Quantified energy-specific subsidies and support by type, FY 2010 and FY 2013), U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/ [https://perma.
cc/RX72-JSBV].
81. See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 61, at 7.
82. Nuclear Costs in Context, at 2-3, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (Aug. 2017), https://
www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/nuclear-costs-context-2018
10.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X9JS-YCYL]
83. Id.
84. Jonathan Crawford, Trump and U.S. Nuclear Power Find Ground in Jobs Push, BLOOMBERG,
(Feb. 7, 2017 10:03 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-07/trump-and-u-s-nucle
ar-power-find-common-ground-in-jobs-push [https://perma.cc/3YTM-BTW3].
85. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 849 (“these new reactors would never be built in states
operating in hybrid and restructured markets”).
86. Id. citing Mark Clayton, Nuclear Power a Viable Competitor in US Energy Market, Study
Finds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 17, 2010) (quoting John Rowe, Exelon CEO), http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0917/Nuclear-power-a-viable-competitor-in-US-energy-market-study-finds
[http://perma.cc/WU25-V66G].
87. See supra note 82, at 5.
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Vermont.88 The plant had a payroll of $66 million and impacts on local
suppliers and businesses totaled approximately $500 million.89 Vernon lost
half of its tax base with the plant closure, severely impacting funding for a
library, town hall, recreation center, and elementary school, as well as its
$2 million emergency fund.90
Marketplace risk for nuclear power is evident with the issues
discussed in this paper, resulting from dropping costs of energy production
and lower revenues for independent power producers. This risk places
economic burdens on companies attempting to engage in long-term power
purchase agreements, often at fixed prices for the duration of the contract.
Recent trends reflect the rise of competitive energy firms as well as new
technological and market risks, familiar trends that began with Edison and
Insull in New York and Illinois in the beginning of the twentieth century.
B. OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL ENERGY MARKETS AND STATE PROGRAMS
FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY
New York operates its electricity marketplace for transmission and
wholesale electricity under the supervision of an ISO, the New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO).91 NYISO manages the energy
markets that allocate real-time energy delivery, ancillary services (e.g., grid
maintenance), and capacity (e.g. future energy reserves).92 Because
NYISO oversees an electricity grid that is physically connected throughout
the eastern United States, and involves energy and service transactions
across multiple states, it is subject to FERC authority.93 This means that
NYISO must notify FERC and submit filings before modifying rates or
rules and regulations pertaining to rates.94 FERC has approved marketbased rates on the theory that they are “just and reasonable” since the
market is designed to prohibit entities from holding market power, thus
freely negotiated contracts do not violate the standard.95
Illinois operates in two regional marketplaces, the Midcontinent

88. Saqib Rahim, When a town loses its economic center, E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060064251[ https://perma.cc/WR7E-JG8N].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Gundlach & Webb, supra note 79, at 10.
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 15.
94. Id. at 2021 (“FERC’s review is intended to ensure that the rates and practices set out [by
NYISO] are just and reasonable”); see also id. citing Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util.
Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008) (holding that the just and reasonable standard is “incapable of
precise judicial definition”).
95. Id. at 22 (“FERC requires the seller to demonstrate that it lacks or has adequately mitigated
market power . . . FERC monitors sellers’ activities in the market to ensure that they do not re-attain
market power”).
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Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) and the PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C. (PJM), an RTO.96 Both MISO and PJM conduct wholesale auctions
that include independent power producers and other market participants
that provide ancillary energy services. Similar to NYISO, both MISO and
PJM are subject to FERC authority and stem from the ability of states and
utilities to implement RTO/ISO management of the electricity grid and
wholesale energy markets under FERC Order 2000. All three marketplaces
use wholesale auction bidding by accepting bids from generators at
increasing prices, beginning with the lowest-priced bid, until the
instantaneous or future demand is met. Each bidding location utilizes
locational-based marginal pricing (LMP), a mechanism by which prices
reflect local demand and supply conditions as well as transmission
constraints that may exist when moving electricity across the grid to meet
demand.97 Market participants propose bids at prices that are economically
efficient for them, thus when bids are accepted, these firms receive
revenues above their expected marginal costs. When the bid price rises too
high, market participants demanding higher prices than the market clearing
price are excluded. In effect, these prices signal to market participants
when to bid into regional energy market auctions.
In a simple example, an RTO/ISO determines that the demand for a
particular zone in its region is 10,000 MW, and it will run an auction to
allow procurement of enough energy to meet this amount with the goal of
establishing a market clearing price.98 A 6000 MW nuclear plant is often
forced to bid at a low price in order to ensure its capacity enters the market
to avoid increased operational costs from shutdown and startup.99 It will
bid 6000 MW for $1 per MW-year. The next lowest-cost bidder, bidder 2,
an efficient power plant, offers 3000 MW at $5000 per MW-year. The
third bidder, a less efficient power plant, offers 1000 MW at $15,000 per
MW-year. The offers from these three bidders totals the 10,000 MW in
demand needed for the zone. A fourth bidder, offering 1000 MW at
$20,000 per MW-year, is excluded from the market since bidder 3 is
offering a lower price per MW-year. The market clearing price in this
96. About MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/9HHF-9GHG]; see also
PJM, http://www.pjm.com/ [https://perma.cc/3H8L-HRCX].
97. Mathangi Srinivasan, Locational Based Marginal Pricing, New York Market Orientation
Course, NYISO (Oct. 17, 2018), http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/services/
market_training/workshops_courses/Training_Course_Materials/NYMOC_MT_ALL_201/Locational_
Based_Marginal_Pricing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WX3-HSD6]; see also PJM Learning Center,
Locational Marginal Pricing, https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/buying-and-selling-energy/lmp.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GP8E-3ZZH].
98. Robin Deliso Woodcock, Your Definitive Guide to (PJM) Capacity Auctions, ENERGYSMART
BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.energysmart.enernoc.com/your-definitive-guide-pjm-capacity-auctio
ns [https://perma.cc/9K7Q-94MQ].
99. Id.
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example is $15,000 per MW-year, as established by the third bidder, and
this amount is paid for each MW-year provided by the three bidders. The
nuclear plant, although bidding at $1 per MW-year, also receives $15,000
per MW-year for the 6000 MW it provides. However, this amount may
nonetheless be below the actual cost of providing the 6000 MW in
capacity, and the nuclear plant may be forced to operate at a loss due to
prevailing market clearing prices. Each ISO/RTO is responsible for
determining the region’s’ real-time energy demands and capacity in order
to administer the auctions effectively.100
The New York Public Service Commission recently adopted a Clean
Energy Standard (CES) that potentially interferes with FERC’s wholesale
market authority by subsidizing certain market participants’ bidding in
regional markets.101 The CES utilizes the social cost of carbon, a figure
determined to represent the dollar amount to society of avoided long-term
damage done by every ton of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere,
to value carbon-free electricity generation and establish the zero emission
credit (ZEC) representing this value.102 The state will provide $965 million
over two years to three nuclear plants that were struggling to compete in
regional markets due to the low price of natural gas.103 In considering the
market structure of NYISO, these nuclear plants had failed to successfully
compete in the market and were unable to secure revenues above their
costs, facing bankruptcy.104 The CES requires that LSEs procure ZECs
from the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority.105
With this procurement mandate serving effectively as a subsidy payment to
ZEC producers (i.e. nuclear plants), ZECs essentially serve to lower the
cost faced by these electricity generators, allowing them to reenter the
market at artificially low bidding prices. This is contrary to free market
principles envisioned by FERC, which aim to reward cost-effective,
innovative market participants that strive to achieve the lowest marginal
costs of service in providing electricity to consumers.

100. See generally, View Point – Capacity Markets: Enabling PJM to obtain sufficient resources to
reliably meet the needs of electric consumers, PJM (2016) http://www.pjm.com/~/media/about-pjm/
newsroom/fact-sheets/20161019-view-point-capacity-markets.ashx [https://perma.cc/BR2P-2VXP].
101. Robert Walton, Updated: New York PSC approves 50% clean energy standard, nuclear
subsidies, UTILITYDIVE (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-new-york-psc-appr
oves-50-clean-energy-standard-nuclear-subsidies/423635/ [https://perma.cc/2SXF-L6W5].
102. See generally The Social Cost of Carbon, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY https://
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html [https://perma.cc/9DR9-9X7M].
103. Robert Walton, What the Hughes v. Talen Supreme Court decision means for state power
incentives, UTILITYDIVE (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-the-hughes-v-talensupreme-court-decision-means-for-state-power-incen/418046/ [https://perma.cc/J96D-SZKY].
104. Id.
105. See Clean Energy Standard, https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Ener
gy-Standard [https://perma.cc/E96L-FAZ8].

ARSHAK CUTTING CARBON FINAL ARTICLE_MCCARTHY ADDS BIO FN%5B1%5D.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)12/13/2018 10:37 AM

Winter 2019

COMPETING TO CUT CARBON

189

Similarly, later in 2016, Illinois passed the Future Energy Jobs Act,
which also made amendments to the Illinois Power Agency Act in
establishing a ZEC program.106 Arguably, legislators handed out $2.4
billion in subsidies to two nuclear plants that were no longer economical to
operate over ten years, citing environmental benefits of zero emission
energy generation technology and economic interests.107 The two plants
lost a combined $100 million per year because competing energy
generation sources, such as natural gas and wind energy, caused lower
market clearing prices and revenues for market participants.108
Among other changes to state renewable energy and energy efficiency
policies, FEJA establishes a zero emission standard that will support these
at risk nuclear facilities by directing development of “plans and processes
for the procurement of zero emission credits from zero emission facilities,”
specifically nuclear plants, commencing June 1, 2017.109 The program
awards ten-year contracts for procurement of ZECs from zero emission
facilities, and the zero emission credit prices awarded on these procurement
contracts will be set through a statutory formula which will be set once per
delivery year.110 The statute incorporates environmental concerns into
winning bid selection criteria by providing that winning bids shall be
selected “based on public interest criteria that include, but are not limited
to, minimizing carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity
consumed in Illinois and minimizing sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and
particulate matter emissions that adversely affect the citizens of
[Illinois].”111

106. Future Energy Jobs Act, Public Act 099-0906 (12/7/16), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/
99/SB/PDF/09900SB2814lv.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZV3S-92XT]; see also Benjamin Storrow,
Midwestern lawmakers green the grid, slightly, UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 19, 2016).
107. See Storrow, supra note 106; see also Oddball political coalition lauds new energy policy,
UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 12, 2016) (“Critics said the new law would force utility customers to pay billions of
dollars to subsidize the two unprofitable nuclear plants owned by a highly profitable corporation.
Supporters said the legislation would bring a series of long-term benefits by keeping the nuclear plants
open while increasing investment in renewable power and energy efficiency”).
108. James Conca, Illinois Sees the Light – Retains Nuclear Power, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/12/04/illinois-sees-the-light-retains-nuclear-power/#1f
3324143e7b [https://perma.cc/4FZY-LUG8].
109. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/1-75(a) (2017).
110. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) (2017).
111. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C) (2017).
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III. INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE ENERGY POLICIES AND FEDERAL
LAW
A. HUGHES AND FERC AUTHORITY OVER WHOLESALE POWER
MARKETS
In 2016, in “the most complicated and lowest-profile of recent FERC
cases to come before the U.S. Supreme Court,” the Court provided some
guidance regarding the ability of states to alter rules and impact federallyregulated wholesale energy markets.112 Maryland regulators anticipated
shortages in electricity supply with coming coal plant retirements and
decided to incentivize in-state construction of a 650-MW gas-fired plant by
allowing state load-serving entities (LSEs) (e.g., electric utilities serving
retail customers) to compensate the difference between a state-stipulated
contract price and the market clearing price in PJM.113 Essentially, this
provided market price protection through a “contract for differences” by
providing payment guarantees to the market participant in case accepted
bids were below the cost of service. The Court found that “FERC
extensively regulates the structure of the PJM capacity auction to ensure
that it efficiently balances supply and demand, producing a just and
reasonable clearing price” and concluded that this federal authority
preempted Maryland’s incentives for in-state energy generation.114
The Court stressed that this was a narrow decision, focused on one
gas-fired plant in particular, with identifiable market advantages, and
“Hughes simply does not speak to how wholesale markets fail to price
important values, such as environmental concerns and reliability.”115 The
Court found preemption upon finding that the contract for differences
disregarded an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.116
The contract mechanism in Hughes was intended to disregard the
wholesale market prices resulting from auctioning. Arguably, if FERC has
not adopted a regime that prices these attributes in the wholesale market,
such as setting a federal price on carbon emissions, states are free to adopt
initiatives that do not intrude wholesale rate authority, such as the CES
ZEC payments or FEJA’s zero emission standard.117
New York and Illinois have attempted to price carbon emissions
within their states and award certain generators of zero emission electricity
directly using similar out-of-market prices, actions that arguably impact
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg. LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016); see also Walton, supra note 103.
See Walton, supra note 103.
Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294–97.
Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 448-49 (2016).
Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
Id.
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market wholesale rates and ultimately FERC authority. Indeed, “Congress
was likely unaware of the full range of challenges that would be presented
to modern energy markets . . . .”118 As discussed below, federal district
courts in New York and Illinois have provided recent guidance in
interpreting the FPA and Hughes in considering the permissibility of state
policies that can potentially impact federal energy markets.
The dormant Commerce Clause can limit the scope and impact of state
programs aimed to incentivize generation and analyzes whether the “state
statute discriminates against out-of-state businesses or whether it treats
both in-state and out-of-state businesses alike.”119 Facially discriminatory
laws against interstate commerce are unconstitutional, while facially
neutral laws are examined further for discriminatory effects through
analysis of their impacts on interstate commerce.120 Lastly, if the law is
found to be discriminatory, then it will only be upheld “so as long as its
benefit outweighs its burden on interstate commerce.”121 Given the
intricate nature of the energy system, including the complexity of market
transactions and uncertainty about future outcomes, it can be difficult to
assess impacts on interstate commerce. However, “courts have applied
strict scrutiny to state laws that were enacted simply to promote job
creation or economic development, if by doing so, they unduly burden
interstate commerce.”122
Plaintiffs who bring dormant Commerce Clause claims must have
standing, which requires that plaintiffs have “an ‘injury in fact’” and that
the injury be “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the defendant.123
Thus, if the injuries are “not traceable to discrimination against the
commerce of other states,” then plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a
dormant Commerce Clause claim.124 Specifically, the dormant Commerce
Clause protects the economic interests of out-of-state entities, and
“[p]laintiffs must ‘allege an injury stemming from the application of the
[state policy] in a manner discriminatory to out-of-state interests’ . . .
whether due to facial discrimination against or an undue burden on out-ofstate economic interests.”125

118. Id.
119. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 618, 620 (“The Commerce Clause provides Congress with the
power ‘[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several States’” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
120. Id. at 621.
121. Id. at 624 (known as the “Pike balancing test” (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970)).
122. Id. at 62930 (“Even if the Court characterizes the purpose as promoting local interests, so long
as the law regulates evenhandedly, it will be characterized as legitimate”).
123. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
124. See infra note 145, at 7.
125. See supra note 123, at 582.
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B. CHALLENGES TO THE NEW YORK CES ORDER AND ZEC PROGRAM IN
FEDERAL COURT
In New York, a federal court upheld the ZEC program under the CES,
dismissing challenges from independent power producers who argued that
the ZEC program intruded federal jurisdiction to regulate rates and tariffs
in wholesale power markets and violated the Constitution by discriminating
against out-of-state power plants.126 The opinion begins with identifying
that climate change is an issue and that “New York and many other States
have decided that they will do their part to reduce the emissions that
contribute to global warming.”127 In relying heavily on Hughes, the court
examines the CES order in detail and concludes that (1) the ZEC program
is not field preempted under the FPA, (2) is not conflict preempted under
FERC objectives, (3) and does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
C. THE ZEC PROGRAM AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Plaintiffs argued that the ZEC program is both field preempted and
conflict preempted.128 However, the court concluded that the program is
not “tethered” to wholesale auctions, does not directly affect the wholesale
prices in these auctions, and does not interfere with FERC’s objective of
maintaining competitive energy markets.129 “Field preemption exists where
‘Congress has forbidden the State to take action in the field that the federal
statute pre-empts.’”130 By contrast, conflict preemption “exists where
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or where the state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”131
In considering field preemption, the court recognized, citing Hughes,
that the “FPA is a paragon of cooperative federalism; it divides
responsibility for the regulation of energy between state and federal
regulators.”132 Most importantly, the court noted that that where federal
and state efforts must coordinate within an administrative framework in
pursuit of common purposes, the court is less likely to find federal
preemption.133 Here, FERC has substantial authority over wholesale rates
and rules and has authority to “ensure that rules or practices ‘affecting’

126.
2017).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Coalition for Competitive Electricity, v. Zibelman, 272 F.Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
Id. at 554.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 569–77.
Id. at 567 (citing Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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wholesale rates are just and reasonable.”134 Hughes “left open the
possibility for States to ‘encourag[e] production of new or clean generation
through measures untethered to a generator’s wholesale market
participation.’”135 Plaintiffs claimed that the program is an “impermissible
tether” because “(1) a nuclear generator is eligible for a ZEC only if the
NYISO auction rates are insufficient . . . (2) ZEC prices are calculated
using forecast wholesale rates; and (3) the nuclear generators receiving the
ZECs sell all of their power directly into the auction markets.”136 The court
found that (1) there exist many state programs that “involve propping up
the operation of a generator that might otherwise be unprofitable,” (2) ZEC
prices are unrelated to the recipient’s market participation, and (3) that the
“CES Order itself does not require the nuclear generators to sell into the
NYISO auction.”137 In comparing to Hughes, the court recognized that in
Hughes “there was a direct and concrete tie (or tether) between the
contracts-for-difference and the generator’s wholesale market
participation”138 and that “New York has successfully threaded the needle
left by Hughes that allows States to adopt innovative programs to
encourage the production of clean energy.”139
The court also dismissed plaintiff’s conflict preemption claim, noting
that “when the State is legitimately regulating a matter of state concern,
‘FERC’s exercise of its authority must accommodate” that state regulation
“[u]nless clear damage to federal goals would result.’”140 The ZEC
program “does not thwart the goal of an efficient energy market; rather, it
encourages through financial incentives the production of clean energy”
since it does not guarantee a particular market price for ZEC-eligible
recipients and does not present “clear damage” required for a finding of
conflict preemption.141 To hold otherwise, the court importantly noted,
“would call into question [renewable energy credits] and all state subsidies,
such as tax incentives and land grants” that also exert “price-distorting
effects on market signals and allow some generators to clear the auction
when they otherwise would be priced out.”142

134. Id. (citing FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016)).
135. Id. at 568 (citing Hughes at 1299).
136. Id. at 569.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 562.
139. Id. at 564.
140. Id. at 564 (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansans, 109 S. Ct.
1262, 522 (1989)).
141. Id. at 566.
142. Id.
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D. THE ZEC PROGRAM AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause claims
since “they do not allege a nexus between their injury and any
discriminatory aspect of the ZEC program.”143 To violate the dormant
Commerce Clause, a state law or regulation must “(1) clearly [discriminate]
against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce, (2) [impose] a
burden on interstate commerce incommensurate with the local benefits
secured, or (3) [have] the practical effect of ‘extraterritorial’ control of
commerce occurring entirely outside the boundaries of the state in
question.”144 Indeed, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege injury to
their out-of-state entities arising from discrimination against or an undue
burden from the ZEC program.145 The court recognized that plaintiffs
would be similarly burdened if the ZEC program expanded to out-of-state
nuclear plants (i.e., their power plants would still not receive ZEC
payments), and therefore, the alleged injury falls outside the “zone of
interests” protected by the dormant Commerce Clause.
E. CHALLENGES TO ILLINOIS’ FEJA AND ZEC PAYMENTS IN FEDERAL
COURT
Earlier in July, a federal district court in the Northern District of
Illinois dismissed challenges to Illinois’ FEJA and its ZEC program, where
consumer plaintiffs and independent power producers (the Electric Power
Supply Association) had brought similar claims of preemption and dormant
Commerce Clause violations.146 Plaintiffs argued that the ZEC program is
preempted by the FPA and FERC authority over wholesale markets and
alleged that “a state regulation that substantially affects the quantity or
terms of wholesale sales is preempted.”147 However, the court held that
“Illinois does not require participation in wholesale auctions in order to
receive ZECs . . . [nuclear generators] can receive ZECs even if they do not
participate in the energy auction.”148 Therefore, since the ZEC does not
require that nuclear generators clear auctions in PJM or MISO, the court
concluded that “the state . . . is not imposing a condition directly on
wholesale transactions.”149 In conclusion, the court held that Illinois “has
sufficiently separated ZECs from wholesale transactions such that the
[FPA] does not preempt the state program under principles of field
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163, 2017 WL3008289, (N.D. III. July 14, 2017).
Id. at *11.
Id. at *13.
Id.
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preemption.”150 In dismissing the conflict preemption claim, the court held
that there had not been “clear damage” to FERC’s goals from the ZEC
program and that “the interplay between state and federal regulation can
continue to exist” since “[t]he regulatory structure remains unaltered, and
FERC’s power undiminished.”151
Lastly, plaintiffs claimed that the ZEC program fails the Pike
balancing test and violates the dormant Commerce Clause “because its
impacts on interstate commerce far outweigh any claimed environmental
benefits” and since it “distorts the market by driving out and deterring the
entry of more cost-efficient, environmentally-friendly, out-of-state
generators.”152 Additionally, plaintiffs pointed to statements of Illinois
Governor Bruce Rauner stating that FEJA was intended to protect the
Clinton and Quad Cities plants and related jobs.153 The court held that the
remarks about potential job-saving attributes of FEJA do not negate the
state’s legitimate interests in (1) environment and public health and (2)
creating and regulating a market to encourage a power mix of its
choosing.154 Lastly, the ZEC program only “indirectly burdens other
generators’ ability to compete in wholesale auctions,” and thus, the
dormant Commerce Clause claim fails.155
F.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCENTIVIZING CLEAN
ENERGY GENERATION SOURCES

The integrated nature of wholesale energy markets, involving multiple
states and regulatory agencies in addition to RTOs/ISOs, requires broader
planning and policy implementation of climate change initiatives aimed at
incentivizing carbon-free electricity generation. State policies, by contrast,
“[d]ue to their partial application . . . provide only incomplete and inchoate
remedies for the market failure [of carbon pricing] and arguably further
distort the market, thereby impairing effective competition among
wholesale buyers and sellers.”156 The FPA gives FERC authority over
wholesale sales of electricity, and subsequent orders by FERC have
asserted federal authority over certain aspects of regional wholesale market
operations.157 PJM and NYISO are exploring options to better integrate
carbon-pricing within their regions and ensure market efficiency.
150. Id. at *14.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *16.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Gundlach & Webb, supra note 79, at 61 (“any carbon pricing scheme proposed by NYISO
would have to be integrated with [regional carbon pricing and trading markets]”).“”
157. See supra note 23.
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Additionally, the Department of Energy (DOE) under Secretary Rick Perry
has responded to industry and political concerns and has proposed new
market rules to provide compensation to base load power generation plants
such as coal and nuclear, “outlining what would be the biggest overhaul in
competitive energy markets since their establishment in the late 1990s.”158
However, on January 8, 2018, FERC rejected the DOE NOPR and directed
regional market operators to examine grid resilience issues and submit
relevant information to FERC to inform future regulatory action in a new
proceeding.159
The regional market concept has effectively incentivized investment
in the renewable energy sector at unprecedented levels, with a recent plan
from PacifiCorp to invest in a $3.5 billion wind farm in light of “PURPAenabled” success in wind and solar.160 Additionally, American Electric
Power also introduced an investment plan of $1.8 billion into “competitive,
contracted renewable energy projects.”161 Allowing these ZECs to occur
and thereby potentially affect wholesale market auctions could introduce
regulatory uncertainty and impair investment, since “[t]he fact that, at any
time, regulatory agencies could introduce a subsidy for certain resources
that would suppress wholesale market prices will very likely eliminate the
willingness for competitive suppliers to enter the wholesale market.”162
Indeed, PJM reports that the recently “proposed subsidy solutions in
all cases ignore the opportunity cost of subsidizing uneconomic units,
which is the displacement of resources and technologies that would
otherwise be economic.”163 A recent study found that despite their
158. Department of Energy, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed.
Reg. 46940, 46941 (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-10-10/pdf/2017-213
96.pdf; see also Gavin Bade, Updated: DOE proposes cost recovery for baseload generators in new
FERC rule, UTILITYDIVE (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-doe-proposescost-recovery-for-baseload-generators-in-new-ferc-rul/506137/ [https://perma.cc/JN3G-NHX5].
159. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing
Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012-01 (2018).
160. Jeff St. John, Breaking Down PacifiCorp’s $3.5B Wind Power Investment Plan, GREENTECH
MEDIA (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/breaking-down-pacificorps-3.5bwind-power-investment-plan [https://perma.cc/YK98-7YU6]; see generally Solar Market Insight
Report 2016 Year in Review, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, http://www.seia.org/researchresources/solar-market-insight-report-2016-year-review [https://perma.cc/P8BR-MUXB]..
161. Peter Maloney, AEP to invest $1.8B in renewable energy, UTILITYDIVE (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aep-to-invest-18b-in-renewable-energy/510192/ [https://perma.cc/P5
4G-ZHVH].
162. Stu Bresler, Potential Alternative Approach to Expanding the Minimum Offer Price Rule to
Existing Resources, at 1, PJM Conference and Training Center (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.
pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/stakeholder-meetings/grid-2020-focus-on-public-policy-marketefficiency/meeting-materials/20160816-potential-alt-solution-to-the-min-offer-price-rule-for-existingresources.ashx [https://perma.cc/P7SZ-MN4L].
163. State of the Market Report for PJM Volume 2: Detailed Analysis, MONITORING ANALYTICS
LLC (Mar. 9, 2017), at 2, http://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/03/10/document_pm_06.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EHB9-GR3P].
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imperfections, regional markets lower costs, saving about $3 billion a year
in electricity generation.164 Distorting market incentives for a period as
long as ten years could potentially harm regional market structures and
decrease savings for consumers in the long run.
Those defending the subsidies claim that they are similar in structure
and legal validity to renewable energy certificates/credits (RECs) currently
offered by states and sold in energy marketplaces.165 Both New York and
Illinois wholesale markets currently include or plan to include RECs.166
The Environmental Protection Agency defines RECs as a market-based
instrument that is a representation of environmental and social benefits of
renewable energy generation.167 When renewable energy generators
produce electricity, one REC is awarded per MW-hour of electricity
generated. RECs, through certificate tracking systems, can be sold
separately or together with the electricity they generate.168 RECs transfer
the ownership rights of the attributes of renewable electricity generation
“despite the physical inability to identify the exact generating source” to
which they are attributed.169 In 2003, FERC issued an order stating that
RECs are “outside the confines of PURPA” and that a utility purchasing
electricity from a power generator does not automatically receive
ownership rights to RECs.170 Lastly, FERC stated that states can adopt
legislation that regulates and assigns ownership of RECs.171
In upholding the CES ZEC program and Illinois’ FEJA, federal
district courts likened ZECs to RECs.172 Most importantly, “FERC has
disclaimed jurisdiction over RECs . . . when those instruments are sold
independently of FERC-jurisdictional energy sales.”173 In New York, the
court concluded that ZEC transactions are separate from wholesale energy
sales and that “FERC’s acknowledgement that RECs are outside its
jurisdiction indicates that similar programs . . . distinct from wholesale

164. Steve Cicla, Imperfect Markets Versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation
(Jan. 22, 2017) at 40, https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/UofC%20
Electricity%20Gov%20v%20Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR6-8WM7].
165. See Walton, supra note 103.
166. See generally Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY (last visited Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/renewable-energy-certificatesrecs [https://perma.cc/8DHS-RH27].
167. Id.
168. Renewable Electricity: How do you know you are using it? at 1, National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (Aug. 2015), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/64558.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZRY-98L9].
169. Todd Jones et al., The Legal Basis for Renewable Energy Certificates, at 7, Center for
Resource Solutions (June 17, 2015), http://resource-solutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/TheLegal-Basis-for-RECs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HQY-CSH8].
170. American Ref-Fuel Company, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,004, 61,007 (2003).
171. Id.
172. See supra note 125, at *563; see also supra note 145, at *13.
173. See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 20.
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transactions are not preempted.”174 Similarly, in Illinois, the court held that
“sales of ZECs are unbundled” from wholesale sales and are not
preempted.175
Recommendations for Pricing Carbon Dioxide Emissions in NYISO
In New York, considering a different approach to carbon pricing other
than subsidies (e.g., mandatory ZEC procurement under the CES), a
uniform standard for applying prices for avoided carbon dioxide emissions
could provide more economically efficient outcomes since this mechanism
would reward other similar socially beneficial energy generators.176
Similar to the carbon pricing framework by PJM, a recent report prepared
for NYISO concludes that “a carbon charge would be a straightforward and
economically efficient way to harmonize New York’s environmental goals
and the wholesale market design by pricing the environmental externality
associated with carbon emissions directly.”177 A NYISO regional carbon
adder could potentially enhance competition aimed at achieving the alleged
goals of the ZEC (i.e., environmental benefits).178 A carbon adder would
impose additional costs per ton of carbon dioxide generated, increasing the
cost of transacting in wholesale markets for carbon-emitting electricity
generation source. Although New York already participates in the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which is a mandatory marketbased emissions trading program, “[h]igher carbon prices [through a
regional carbon adder] would provide a stronger market signal than current
RGGI prices and reward efficiency improvements across the fossil fleet,
incentivize conservation and energy efficiency, encourage storage and
other technologies that can reduce emissions . . . .”179 The report notes that
“CES procurement of RECs and ZECs does not invite competition as
broadly as carbon pricing would since it targets specific resource types and
amounts dependent on solicitations from [NYSERDA].”180 Alternatively,
the carbon price approach would require that “carbon-emitting generation
. . . pay a uniform price on the amount of carbon they emit for each unit of
energy they produce, raising their variable energy costs,” thus providing
carbon-free generation sources an advantage since they would not bear

174. See supra note 125 at *563.
175. See supra note 145 at *13.
176. See Gundlach & Webb, supra note 79, at 42-43.
177. Samuel A. Newell et al., Pricing Carbon into NYISO’s Wholesale Energy Market to Support
New York’s Decarbonization Goals, 7, THE BRATTLE GROUP (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.nyiso.
com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/documents/Studies_and_Reports/Studies/Market_Studies/Pric
ing_Carbon_into_NYISOs_Wholesale_Energy_Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/62YX-QVPR].
178. See Gundlach & Romany Webb, supra note 79 at 48.
179. Samuel A. Newell et al., supra note 177 at v.
180. Id. at 14.
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such cost burdens.181 Such a proposal would integrate a uniform price
signal in these wholesale markets and maintain economic principals aimed
at incentivizing low-cost, carbon-free generation.
NYISO can price carbon in one of two ways: (1) apply a price per ton
of carbon emitted in its energy marketplace or (2) implement a cap-andtrade scheme by setting a maximum allowable emissions target (i.e., a
“cap”) and administrating auctions for carbon-generating sources to
purchase and trade these allowable emissions.182 In the first approach,
NYISO would add a carbon charge to each carbon-generating source’s
market transactions based on each generator’s carbon emission rate.183 The
market structure would then incentivize lowest-cost emission generation to
enter and compete in the market (e.g., nuclear plants would receive an
economic advantage over gas and coal plants in selling their generated
electricity in the market). Cap-and-trade programs, however, would likely
pose “a greater administrative burden [for design, operation, and
compliance] than a carbon price administered by the NYISO.”184 A carbon
price adder also poses significant challenges, including the determination
of an appropriate price, appropriate allocation of collected carbon funds to
customers, and prevention of emissions leakage to neighboring energy
markets.185 In summary, a carbon charge “would send granular price
signals on carbon costs to the entire market, penalizing high-emitting
resources and rewarding low-emitting ones . . . [and] would improve the
economic efficiency of meeting the state’s energy and environmental
goals.”186
In California, “FERC has approved a California Independent System
Operator (CAISO) tariff that incorporates the costs of allowances for that
state’s economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade program.”187 FERC has allowed
cap-and-trade programs and related allowance costs to meet the just and
reasonable standard since the 1990s.188 As a result, states can incorporate
costs of meeting cap-and-trade requirements in their wholesale energy

181. Id.
182. Id. at 18–19.
183. Id. at 19.
184. Id. at 20.
185. Id. at 2223 (Determining a carbon price must be modified over time and can reflect working
group determinations of the social cost of carbon or at a price intended to achieve the states
decarbonization targets. Charging for a price of carbon would result in a sizeable fund that can be used
to mitigate the costs to consumers of increased LMPs throughout the wholesale marketplace. Applying
localized carbon pricing to reduce local emissions can result in other states participating in the RGGI to
increase their emissions and meet RGGI allowances.).
186. Id. at 6162.
187. Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale
Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 31 (2017).
188. Id.
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transactions. California and CAISO have been successful in increasing
carbon-free energy procurement while planning nuclear power plant
closures, conforming to a rapidly changing energy sector and policy
demands.189
PJM Proposals for Addressing State Actions Affecting Wholesale Power
Markets
PJM recognizes challenges that state policies can pose to wholesale
energy markets within its territory and has also proposed a carbon-pricing
framework along with two other proposals that are beyond the scope of this
note.190 PJM has noted that “[s]tate actions take the form of subsidies or
out-of-market economic support that currently impedes formation of
competitive prices in PJM Interconnection’s capacity and energy
markets.”191 Given the impacts of a direct subsidy to in-state electricity
generators bidding into federally-regulated regional markets that do not
provide similar subsidies, PJM has explored an alternative solution that
balances the goals of maintaining the correct price signal to incentivize and
maintain the competitive entry necessary to achieve long-term resource
adequacy while also committing only the quantity of capacity necessary in
any given delivery year.192
Specifically, PJM proposes a carbon pricing framework that can be
adopted in wholesale markets that would (1) establish a price per ton of
carbon emissions, (2) apply to carbon-emitting suppliers on a per-ton basis
and be reflected in offers, (3) be revealed in wholesale market prices in the
participating region or sub-region, and (4) improve the relative
competitiveness of lower-emitting resources, including those that do not
emit carbon.193 Implementing a carbon pricing framework, which FERC
has concluded would be within PJM authority, would establish a
competitive landscape in which low-carbon or carbon-free energy
generation sources are rewarded for the attributes they provide to society
through the market uniformly. ZECs and RECS are arguably uniform in
189. Eric Gimon, A Guide to the Debate Over Closing Nuclear Plants, GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 6,
2017),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/a-survivors-guide-to-the-debate-over-existingnuclear-plants [https://perma.cc/D8TL-TBQV].
190. Context for PJM Market Design Proposals Responding to State Public Policy Initiatives, at 12, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170612-context-for-pjm
-market-design-proposals-responding-to-state-public-policy-initiatives.ashx
[https://perma.cc/4VZ49Y75].
191. Id. at 1.
192. See Bresler, supra note 162.
193. Advancing Zero Emissions Objectives through PJM’s Energy Markets: A Review of CarbonPricing Frameworks, at 1, PJM (August 23, 2017), http://pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/
special-reports/20170502-advancing-zero-emission-objectives-through-pjms-energy-markets.ashx
[https://perma.cc/JF3T-3NMB].
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their application in that they recognize and reward various carbon-free
energy generation attributes. However, as discussed above, a carbon
pricing scheme implemented at the regional level would unite these two
concepts, allow for better coordination of state climate change goals, and
retain faith in regional power markets by establishing uniform prices and
tariffs. RTOs/ISOs will have to carefully assess how to best implement
carbon-pricing within their regions given existing state policies that impact
wholesale power markets. While the ZEC program and Illinois’ FEJA
have survived challenges in federal district and appellate courts194, FERC,
PJM, and NYISO are actively considering proposals for carbon-pricing and
other structural market changes within those regions.
CONCLUSION
U.S. wholesale power markets are currently facing the most
significant challenges to their structure and operation in decades.
Competition in electricity markets has increased investment in the energy
sector and incentivized innovation that avoids the environmental harms of
greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector. Along with the
industry, private ownership of power generation sources in the United
States has grown, and in local economies, retirement of power plants can
have disproportionate impacts. FERC, regional commissions, state
legislatures, and industry stakeholders should collaborate to propose
solutions for managing existing electricity loads and ensuring economically
efficient outcomes. Twenty-first century energy technologies and differing
state climate change policies demand that FERC allow states to incentivize
targeted energy generation through subsidies or otherwise while refraining
from endorsing anticompetitive market principles.

194. See generally, Coalition for Competitive Electricity, et al. v. Zibelman, et al., 906 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 2018); see generally Electric Power Supply Assoc. et al. v. Anthony M. Star et al., 904 F.3d 518
(7th Cir. 2018).
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